Nuclear in Biofuels Nuclear Beothermal Biofuels Nuclear Data Biofu

Pre-conditions for Financing Nuclear power

`Randvoorwaarden' voor Financieringvan Kerncentrales

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WHOLESALE BANKING

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Introduction & benefits of nuclear




Introduction

	 Security of supply – reliance on politically unstable regions
Why Nuclear?	Environment
	Economically affordable
Changing Dynamics	Dynamics of Nuclear Power plants is changing from Government to mostly Private sector. What are possibilities for private funding?
Conditions for funding	 To access private sector funding requirements we need to look at
	 what are the key risks to lenders & how can we mitigate risks
	 what has been done, what can we learn and how did it work
	 impact of 'Notitie van Geel' (Randvoorwaarden voor nieuwe Kerncentrales)
Government Support	For Nuclear to be a viable option what support is needed from the Government?

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Benefits of nuclear

Environment



Source: IEA, 2002 is latest available data

CCGT equivalent CO² emissions


	Nuclear Prod (TWh)	CCGT Equivalent CO ² (t mn)	Kyoto 2012 Targets (t mn)	2002 CO ² Emissions (t mn) ⁽²⁾
France	427	154	565	567
Belgium	45	16	136	146.9
Finland	22	8	77	71.1
Czech Republic	25	9	177	196.3
Germany	158	57	990	1,230
Spain	61	22	330	289.4
UK	74	27	653	768
Netherlands	3	1.3	201	214

Note: (1) Based on a carbon intensity of 0.36 tonnes/MWh; Source: European Environment Agency, Morgan Stanley Research; (2) Latest figures provided to IEA, base year may vary



Benefits of nuclear

Economic viability



Surging commodity prices and impact of CO² cost improve economic viability of Nuclear, although fuel prices are volatile and have impact on nuclear without off-take contract

Source: ING Research estimates

Dynamics of financing



Dynamics of financing

Changing dynamics – Government to private sector

Ownership evolution

Government & State owned companies

France (EDF) Sweden (Vattenfall) UK (BE) Russia China India Large utilities privatised

Often as a consequence of privatisation

Belgium (Electrabel) Germany (E.ON, RWE) Japan (Tepco, Kansai Electric, Kyushu...) Spain (Endesa, Iberdrola, UF) US (Entergy, Exelon, FPL)

Independent developers

Finland (TVO) US (NuStart, Unistar Nuclear)

Debt evolution:

Government debt


Equity & Corporate debt

Hybrid debt

Will true project finance be possible? Level of Government involvement?



Dynamics of financing Cash flow cycle





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Dynamics of financing


Key risks associated with nuclear

Planning/ development/ construction	 Pre planning process – public opinion and Government support Licensing – timing of process and risk of not obtaining a License Construction – dology and cost systems
CONSTRUCTION	 Construction – delay and cost overrun
Market risk	 Uncertainty environmental policy (CO² prices) Ability to compete with other fuels Price risk influenced by high Capex and long lead time
Liability & safety	 Accidents on site and/or during transportation of waste Environmental accidents Depth insurance market
Waste storage and disposal costs	 Government commitment to solution – no solution in most countries Public support Financial support
Decommissioning	 Limited experience and widely different cost estimates (EUR200m-2bn/1000MW) Dependent on technology and standardisation levels

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Dynamics of financing

Impact of key risk on cash flow cycle





Market risk

- Government can mitigate market risk by:
 - some sort of subsidised mechanism to assist with the increased capital costs of new generation nuclear units:
 e.g.: Federal Guarantee 2005 US Energy Policy Act for up to 80% of project cost
 - Also, Clear environmental policy e.g.: Kyoto, CO² allocation
- Developers can mitigate market risk through
 - Long term off-take contracts

Lenders may take limited amount of price risk if coverage ratios are robust



Planning/licensing/construction

- Governments/regulatory bodies need to set adequate legal framework
 - Addressed by 'Notitie van Geel'
 - e.g. the new Combined Construction and Operating License introduced in the US
 - the standby support coverage proposed by the **2005 US Energy Policy Act** provides financial cover for delays beyond the industry's control
- Contractors & developers: expected to assume the bulk of these risks once the **regulatory bodies** have **set** the **adequate framework**



Waste storage, disposal costs & decommissioning

- Government needs to be commitment to solution for waste disposal
 - Addressed by 'Notitie van Geel'
 - Provide stable **regulatory framework**
 - Adequate research, know how support & coordination with other countries
- Sharing of risk by industry players and/or the Government
 - dedicated provisioning of internal or external funds financed by operators
 - **State responsibility** such as in the UK (National Decommissioning Authority and the Nuclear Liabilities Fund) and Spain (Enresa)

Lenders unlikely to assume waste & decommissioning risk



Safety and liability

- Government support in setting National energy policies
 - need to close oldest plants
 - ensure new plants meet best standards & operated by highly experienced nuclear operators
 - high level of industry discipline is maintained
- Need to raise the depth of the Insurance market for liabilities
 - ability to provide financial security to meet increased liability amount
 - currently inability to provide cover for the full re-instatement value?
- International Conventions & certain National acts and laws address limitation of liability
 - Paris and Vienna Conventions, subsequent Brussels convention, national nuclear legislation
 - Price-Anderson Act and EPACT 2005
 - > first US\$300m liability to be insured by each reactor
 - above and up to US\$96m per reactor, mutualisation of the risk among all US nuclear operations

Lenders will require significant insurance before considering these risks





Project in a nutshell

Sponsors	 Teollisuuden Voima Oy (TVO) is a privately owned generating company established in 1969 Main shareholders of TVO are Fortum and PVO, who are active
	participants and risk sharers
Existing Nuclear Power Plants	 2 X 860 MW, BWR, Westinghouse Atom (Olkiluoto 1 and 2) Commercial operation in 1979 and 1982
	 Modernization and upgrade in 19941998 and 20052006
New Nuclear Power Project: Olkiluoto 3	 Planning started in 1997 Investment decision: December 18, 2003 Start up: 2010 Reactor type: EPR (PWR) Net Electrical output: 1,630 MW
	 Investment cost: EUR3bn



Pre-conditions (Randvoorwaarden) investment considerations

Public & politics	 Broadly favourable public opinion
	 Long term political support for nuclear
	Proper political process
	• Some recognition for carbon-free generation with long term certainty
Legal & financing	 Transparent legal framework for licensing & planning
Waste	 Waste management solution agreed, implemented and funded
	 Stable and committed organisation and management
Strong project	 Reliable and creditworthy shareholders, and favourable rating
parties	treatment
	 Committed project counterparties

Need to create similar favourable environment

Source: Case Study: Financing the Olkiluoto 3 project, Lauri Piekkari, TVO, Euromoney Conference




Key commercial factors contributing to the success of nuclear build

Construction	 The construction of the plant is under turnkey contract ('fixed price') arrangements
Proven technology	 Deployment of a proven technology (EPR), with a 40 year economic lifetime
Operation	 TVO are recognised as highly successful and reputable nuclear operator, with high performing plant
Off take	 There are long term off take contracts in place (~15years) from a wide group of high/intensive energy users
Financing	 Construction and operation is being financed by 20% equity and 80% debt (5% shareholders of TVO and 75% from banks)

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Financing structure development



Source: Case Study: Financing the Olkiluoto 3 project, Lauri Piekkari, TVO, Euromoney Conference

Solutions of the current structure, and future aspirations...

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- Medium term facility, 5 & 7 year loan tranches
- Flexibility during construction, to cover construction costs
- No publicity
- Assume same terms RCF



• Buyers credit

Replaced by longer term credit over time

- **Private placements:** long term asset, matching long-term pension liabilities (Canada)
- **Bonds:** Provides investors with alternative energy asset (Current rating A- by Fitch)
- Non or Limited Recourse Project Finance?

Source: Case Study: Financing the Olkiluoto 3 project, Lauri Piekkari, TVO, Euromoney Conference



Lessons learned

Financing structure	 Not Project Finance, but on balance sheet structured lending
	 Structure is set to allow for financial flexibility & refinancing
	 Long term and more efficient financing after completion
	 Refinancing risk taken by shareholders
	 Planning and licensing – sponsors and Government
	 Construction risk allocated to contractors and sponsors
Key Risk	 Market risk taken by offtakers and sponsors
Rey Riok	 Operational risk are taken by sponsors
	 Waste solution and decommissioning – sponsors and Government

Lenders not yet comfortable to take key nuclear risk and as such provide Long Term Project Finance






Public opinion	 Need clear Government support for new nuclear as part of the future energy mix
High costs & liabilities	 Because of the high upfront costs and the additional back-end nuclear liabilities, some kind of government backing is usually required to encourage investment – US EPACT 2005
Regulatory requirements	 Regulation/nuclear industry/government need to develop planning and approval processes so as to minimise delay and uncertainty (Including setting down clear practical public consultation processes) – US EPACT 2005
Waste & decommissioning	 Government setting and progressing implementation of policy on the management of radioactive wastes and decommissioning process and costs – UK & Spain (Responsibility state) Nordic (Shared but corporate have ultimate responsibility), 'Notitie van Geel' (full corporate responsibility)



Market risk	 Government actions to stimulate investment in new nuclear, addressing both the lack of long term pricing signals in the market and the perception of risk among investment institutions (including arrangements to incentivise investors and vendors to fund the early phases of pre-construction activities) – US EPACT
	2005
Research & expertise	 Government needs to ensure that adequate research is undertaken in support of nuclear and that the necessary expertise is available and shared in the market where required

Partly addressed by Randvoorwaarden

Determining the nuclear decommissioning costs



Present

Future

What is the impact of 'Notitie van Geel' with regard to the upfront Guarantee?



Public Private Partnership (PPP)

Possible solutions



If Government willing to share key nuclear risks, financing with more limited recourse to the sponsors will be possible ING

Conclusion



Conclusion

Government support & regulation



Developers and contract parties

Lenders

- Government will need to be actively involved in Nuclear process from forming of public opinion to decommissioning
- Due to political aspect of Nuclear, clear and stable regulatory framework is required
- require Government support or insurance for risks beyond industry control or too large
- Public private partnership a possible solution
 - Developers and contract parties will have to take bulk of risk
- Utilities and contract parties likely team up to share risks
- Not yet comfortable with key risks
- Project finance/non recourse difficult in short term
- Corporate & hybrid facilities likely route