Listening To Others: A Personal View

by Andrew Teller, ENS Society Manager

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Risk Compendia

Ljubljana, June 2003. The ENS general assembly was taking place on the top floor of a hotel near the centre of the city. On a table just outside the conference room, nicely displayed leaflets were waiting to be picked up by the participants. These leaflets presented a number of basic facts on radioactivity and the risks associated with it. Among the arguments was what is known in technical parlance as a risk compendium.

Risk compendia come in the form of tables comparing the risks entailed by various human activities such as cigarette smoking, alcohol drinking, using different transport means, living near a nuclear power plant, etc. The corresponding risks are usually expressed in days of estimated loss of life expectancy or in fatalities per person and hour of exposure. Whatever the yardstick used, such compilations invariably show that the risks resulting from the use of nuclear power generation are much lower than those of most other purposeful activities. By way of illustration, at one end of the spectrum, smoking would cost a human being six years on average. At the other end, living close to an NPP could result in a loss of 15 to 51 days, depending on the radiation dose assumed.

Furthermore, other investigations have revealed that the public tends to grossly overestimate the actual risk of nuclear while it underestimates the risk attached to more familiar activities. It is therefore not surprising that all the advocates of nuclear power invoke risk compendia - along with cost-benefit analyses and the "de minimis.”¹ principle – to support their position. This three-pillared approach embodies an attitude which is steadfastly no-nonsense and fact-driven.

On the other side of the nuclear divide, however, the opponents of nuclear power generation conscientiously ignore risk comparisons. To them, the use of cost-benefit analyses and of the "de minimis" principle is only evidence of hard-nosed insensitivity. The difference in the choice of demonstration tools is so clear-cut that one can predict with 100% reliability the conclusion of a report on nuclear by just looking at which ones have been used.

As far as we supporters of nuclear power generation are concerned, invoking risk compendia elicits two reactions. Firstly, it makes us feel totally justified in advocating the use of nuclear technologies. Secondly, it leads us to consider those who remain unmoved by the cogency of our point as stubborn and impervious to the facts. This is certainly how I personally felt until I started reading the analyses of uncommitted risk specialists. It sometimes pays to listen to others, especially those who know what they are talking about and say it in terms less antagonising than the anti-nuclear. I found the following observation in one of the books I read:

“If an approach produces a clear, persistent, and unwanted signal, the offended parties may choose to discredit the whole approach rather than just contest one particular conclusion.” ²

It then dawned on me that our opponents refuse our demonstration not as a result of simple obstinacy but because of a deep dislike of the conclusion it leads to. Seen in this light, risk compendia appear as a battlefield of our own choosing. No wonder that the opponents of nuclear power generation refuse to meet us there: they know that this is not where they are going to win a battle, let alone the war.

There is something more important, however. Whatever the real reasons for rejecting risk compendia, this rejection can nevertheless be supported by objections deserving to be addressed. The first one is that risk compendia restrict the picture to the consideration of two parameters only: the probability and the extent of the damage. It does not take an environmentalist to admit that there are more facets to risk than this. O. Renn and A. Klinke³ have identified no less than six additional factors deserving to be considered. You might try to guess what they are before looking up the answer provided in the endnote below.⁴

A second objection is that risk compendia rest on the implicit assumption that the current casualty rate is a given that does not call for any further reduction. The assumption is all the more questionable because, in the case of people living close to an NPP, the rather low loss of life expectancy mentioned earlier would hide a wide disparity: hardly any loss for most and quite a lot for some.

Once these objections have been expressed, we cannot afford the luxury of ignoring them. Reiterating the old argument could still provide comfort to the faithful but would not help us vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Worse, it would give those who are neutral and knowledgeable the impression that we are much better at pursuing a monologue than at engaging in a real dialogue.

Bearing the afore-mentioned quotation in mind, the observant reader might object that, if it does indeed apply, then trying other approaches is useless. Insofar as they lead to the same outcome, they would be likewise discounted by our opponents. I beg to differ. There are at least three good reasons for being aware of and addressing, reasonable objections. First, it would provide evidence of our willingness to establish a dialogue with our critics, a claim that we regularly make. Second, we would bring the discussion onto their own battlefield, a move that is much more difficult to ignore. And last but not least, we would provide relevant answers to those individuals who have not yet fashioned their own opinion but are weighing up the pros and cons of the issue.

This having been said, what can we do in the present case? I submit that the best strategy consists in showing that the number of lives saved by the use of nuclear technologies far exceeds the losses it might entail. Of course, this approach will cut no ice with those fundamentalists who assert that nuclear technologies (including military ones) have so far claimed no less than 65 million lives. But for those belonging to the middle ground, who are still trying to shape their own opinion, this alternative approach would highlight the need to examine the issue in a broader perspective. All balance sheets have two sides. The anti-nuclear rhetoric systematically contrasts the actual liabilities of nuclear energy with the virtual assets of ABN (Anything But Nuclear).

We should waste no occasion to remind the middle ground that the assets of nuclear and the liabilities of ABN are also part of the problem.

Notes

¹ The “de minimis” principle excludes cases that are highly unlikely or have very small consequences relative to their factors.

² B. Fischhoff et al, Acceptable Risk (Cambridge University Press, 1981).

³ O. Renn and A. Klinke, Risk Evaluation and Risk Management for Institutional and Regulatory Policy, in ‘On Science and Precaution in the Management of Technological Risk, Volume II’ (Report EUR 19056/EN/2, European Commission, Joint Research Centre).

⁴ Certainty of assessment (for both probability of occurrence and extent of damage), ubiquity, persistency, reversibility, delay effect, potential of (political) mobilisation.