Critical thinking
by Andrew Teller
The press keeps providing a steady flow of dubious
claims concerning this or that element of the nuclear debate.
The forthcoming anniversary of the Chernobyl accident won’t
do anything to improve this situation. Critics of nuclear energy
continue to pile up arguments, old and new (mostly old), justifying
their position. This is all well and fine: it is only normal to
speak up for what one believes is right. I want to be allowed
to enjoy this freedom, so I cannot possibly deny it to anybody
else, were it to someone I disagree with. What worries me is the
methodology used by so many of the protagonists for and against
nuclear energy (mostly against). The reason for my concern is
of course that a conclusion can only be as good as the reasoning
that produced it. The numerous flaws that can impair reasoning
are well known:
-
selective (i.e. biased) use of arguments,
-
factual mistakes that are nevertheless indispensable to
the conclusion submitted,
-
failure to take account of the relevant orders of magnitude
when dealing with quantifiable matters,
-
failing to address obvious objections,
-
preaching sound reasoning methodology but not applying it
to one’s own demonstration,
-
taking for granted what should actually be demonstrated,
-
failing to heed the rules of logic, etc.
We are all liable to fall prey to such pitfalls,
but it appears that all are not equally liable to do so. Research
in the area of cognitive science enables to shed useful light
on the mechanisms presiding the generation of arguments in support
of one’s opinion. One very important finding is that emotion
is an essential ingredient of efficient reasoning. People deprived
from emotions (e.g. due to brain damage) do not reason well. They
would keep pondering the elements of the issue without ever feeling
a need to reach a conclusion. The other side of the coin is that
emotions will affect the decision process well beyond the legitimate
urge to make up one’s mind. We all know by experience that
we recognise instantaneously the impact of any piece of news on
the opinion we currently hold. Our desire to maintain our opinion
will push us to treat this piece of news accordingly. If it confirms
our position, it can be accepted without the minimum amount of
scrutiny required. If it goes against it, we will have to make
heroic efforts not to dismiss it on spurious grounds. This is
what makes all of us, not dispassionate discoverers of truths,
but “motivated reasoners”. Motivated reasoning can
be further described through taking account of the strength of
its two main components. Combining the strength of the directional
goals and with that of the accuracy goals lead to a double entry
table. We so obtain four categories represented in the table below1
|
Weak Accuracy Goals |
Strong Accuracy Goals |
Strong Directional Goals |
Partisan Reasoner
- seeks
to justify a preferred conclusion
- confirmation
or disconfirmation biases in information processing
-
disconfirming evidence may polarise attitudes
|
Intuitive Scientist
-
seeks an accurate conclusion
-
optimising, within subjective limits
- even-handed
with evidence
-
actively adjusts for bias
- updates
beliefs through a Bayesian-like process
|
Weak Directional Goals |
Low Motivation
-
apathetic
-
heuristic
- possibly
no processing
|
Classical Rationality
(normative ideal)
-
Enlightenment man
- reasoning
as dispassionate calculation
|
It must be added that, by natural inclination
or by training, different people fall into different categories.
Given what this e-Bulletin stands for, the reader might expect
me to assert now that the anti-nuclear are Partisan Reasoners
and that the pro-nuclear are close to the ideal of classical rationality.
Wrong: I am quite prepared to admit that the latter are Intuitive
Scientists, which is still better than being a Partisan Reasoner.
Given the topic of this article, the reader might also expect
me to explain why it is not the other way round: the anti-nuclear
as Intuitive Scientists and the pro-nuclear as Partisan Reasoners.
I could engage in a full-fledged, and therefore lengthy, demonstration
of my assertion, but there is a simpler way of meeting the reader’s
expectation. It consists in not attempting to do so at all. My
advice to those who would question my appraisal is: see for yourself.
Read the newspapers, read articles written by opponents of nuclear
energy, scour the Internet for arguments in favour of it. Then
try to identify instances of the failings listed above. Try also
to see where in the above table the authors of the material read
fit best. But above all, get acquainted with critical thinking.
Type these words in the input box of your favourite search engine
if you are not familiar with the concept yet. You will find a
wealth of information on how to reason without falling in any
of the pitfalls mentioned earlier. It will also teach you how
to identify the traps motivated reasoners of all shapes and sizes
are laying for you. If I had to emphasise one single characteristic
of critical thinking, I would point out that it advocates self-regulation.
Critical thinkers define self-regulation as monitoring one’s
own cognitive activities, the elements used in those activities
and the results deduced from them. This implies practicing self-examination
and self-correction2. Critical thinking is therefore
about being alert to one’s own potential failings in order
to better avoid them. This is a demanding exercise. The stronger
the directional goal of the reasoner will be, the weaker will
be the incentive to practice a discipline that is likely to stand
in the way of the reasoner’s objectives.
It has become fashionable nowadays to underline
the environmental dangers threatening us. The fashion has not
yet been extended to calling for the compulsory use on all sides
of the cognitive tools needed to rise to the challenge. The practice
is actually quite the reverse: those who by trade or by natural
inclination are more likely to apply sound rules of reasoning
are being dismissed as a lobby motivated by vested interests.
Critical thinking, not to speak of plain common sense, indicates
that an argument should be accepted or dismissed on the basis
of its strength or weakness, not according to the affiliation
of its author
1 Three Steps toward
a Theory of Motivated Political Reasoning, Milton Lodge and Charles
Taber, in Elements of Reason, Cognition, Choice and the Bounds
of Rationality, Edited by Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins and
Samuel L. Popkin, Cambridge University Press, 2000.
2 See “Critical Thinking: What
it is and Why it Counts” by Peter A. Falcione (can
be downloaded from the Internet).
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